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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Privacy law has been an instrument of social change.  Privacy-
based legal arguments have been used to support progressive claims 
that government must cease to criminalize morally controversial per-
sonal choices.1  But privacy law has also been an effective instrument 
 
 * Anita L. Allen, J.D., Ph.D., is the Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of 
Jurisprudence at the University of Pennsylvania.  
 1 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160–63 (1973) (holding that the fundamental right to 
privacy demands abolishing state laws that categorically criminalize abortion practices 
which were rejected by some but not all ethicists and religious groups).  But see ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 110 (1990) 
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of social stasis.  Privacy-based legal arguments have been used to sup-
port conservative claims that neither government nor fellow citizens 
can interfere with traditional practices merely for the sake of progres-
sive ideas about marriage, family, social life, or citizenship.2  To illu-
strate these points, I explore themes of social progress and social sta-
sis through an examination of First Amendment3 privacy doctrines.  
The Supreme Court has identified associational privacy, information-
al privacy, anonymity, and privacies of religion, thought, and intellect 
as requirements of the First Amendment, giving rise to a robust First 
Amendment jurisprudence of privacy and private choice.4 
The concept of privacy plays a major role in the jurisprudence of 
the First but also the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.  Here, I focus on the First Amendment.  First Amendment 
privacy law is an especially rich context for freshly assessing the past 
 
(suggesting that the “right of privacy” invented by the Warren Court matured into a judi-
cial power to dictate moral codes). 
 2 See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868) (“We will not inflict upon society the 
greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifl-
ing violence.”). 
 3 The Amendment provides that:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Amendment applies to 
Congress, but also to state lawmakers.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) 
(“[W]e . . . assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the 
First Amendment from abridgement by Congress—are among the fundamental personal 
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from impairment by the States.”).  Courts and parties before them have introduced the 
First Amendment guarantees of religion, free expression, and peaceable assembly on be-
half of interests in spiritual life, private thought, anonymity, and exclusive group associa-
tion.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1972) (upholding the ability of 
the Amish religion to reject competitive, material life in favor of simple, spiritual exis-
tence lived in harmony with nature), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) 
(upholding petitioners assertion of a “right to read or observe what he pleases--the right 
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home”), NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (requiring NAACP to produce 
membership list to state is a substantial restraint on freedom of association and would ad-
versely affect members’ ability to foster their beliefs due to fear of exposure and conse-
quent reprisal); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 580–81 (1995) (excluding those whose views are at odds with parade organizers is a 
permissible expressive freedom of speech). 
 4 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that a 
state may not ban anonymous political literature opposing taxes); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 
(holding that a state may not require members of the Amish faith to send children to 
school pursuant to compulsory schooling laws that violated their religious beliefs); Stanley, 
394 U.S. at 568 (holding that criminalizing the mere possession of obscene material in 
the home is prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendment); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 
466 (holding that a state may not require organization to reveal names of its rank-and-file 
members). 
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success and future potential of privacy concept-based jurisprudence 
as an instrument of progressive social change for African Americans, 
women, and gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans.  In First Amend-
ment cases, judicial application of concepts of associational privacy, 
informational privacy, Internet anonymity, and intellectual privacy 
have often furthered the ends of tolerance, respect for individuals, 
and equality.5  But those same concepts of privacy have been applied 
in First Amendment cases to, in effect, preserve the status quo of into-
lerance, disrespect, and inequality.  Indeed, in the First Amendment 
arena, historically subordinated groups and those hostile to the 
equality and dignity of historically subordinated groups have likewise 
claimed privacies of free association, exclusive association, and ano-
nymous speech to further their ends.  As a legal tool, First Amend-
ment privacy jurisprudence is aptly likened to the proverbial double-
edged sword, an attractive but perilous weapon when deployed either 
by socially liberal or socially conservative idealists.  Privacy law must 
be understood both as an instrument of progress and change for the 
better and as an instrument of stasis and change for the worse. 
II.  PRIVACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The word “privacy” does not appear in the original eighteenth-
century U.S. Constitution or in any of its twenty-seven eighteenth, ni-
neteenth, or twentieth century Amendments.6  Little can be made of 
its absence.7  That is because, although the Founders and Framers did 
not include the word “privacy” in the text of the written constitution, 
rich conceptions of privacy are implicit in any plausible renderings of 
the text.  That privacy and private property are implicit constitutional 
values is strongly reflected in the Third Amendment’s limit on gov-
ernment access to private houses:  “No Soldier shall, in time of peace 
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
 
 5 Examples of such cases are focal points of this Article and will include Patterson, 357 U.S. 
at 466 (holding that a state may not demand membership list of civil rights group dedi-
cated to African American equality) and Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 
1970) (finding that a state may not demand names and registration of members of a Na-
tion of Islam group that purchased land in state). 
 6 See generally Anita L. Allen, Constitutional Law and Privacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 145 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010) (advancing argument 
repeated here that protection for privacy is implicit in explicit in nation's founding prin-
ciples and Bill of Rights). 
 7 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 
(2011) (“The text of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does not say everything one 
needs to know to resolve all possible cases and controversies.”). 
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time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”8  That privacy 
is a constitutional value is also strongly reflected in the Fourth 
Amendment.9  Recognizing a proper sphere of household, social, and 
work product privacy, the Fourth Amendment asserts that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.10  
The Fifth Amendment shelters private thoughts and belief by limiting 
the government’s power to compel persons to provide evidence 
against themselves that would lead to their prosecution in a criminal 
proceeding:  “[N]or shall any person . . . be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself.”11  The Ninth Amendment 
guarantee of unenumerated rights acknowledges deeply rooted tradi-
tions of non-interference with decision making about personal life:  
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”12 
In the eighteenth century, as now, normative ideals of privacy and 
private choice in everyday life subsisted in common understandings 
of the proper means and ends of constitutional law, including the 
protection of houses, intimacy, conscience, business, and personal 
communications, and through limits on state intrusion, surveillance, 
 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. III; see also Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The 
Third Amendment was designed to assure a fundamental right to privacy.”); Robert A. 
Gross, Public and Private in the Third Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 215, 221 (1991) (not-
ing that the Third Amendment provides a “foundation for a right of privacy guaranteed 
by the Constitution”). 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  But see Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 1511, 1515 (2010) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation 
of privacy test should be abandoned). 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (conceding 
that the Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion”). 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Cf. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12 (1966) (noting 
that the Fifth Amendment reflects “our respect for the inviolability of the human perso-
nality and the right of each individuals ‘to a private enclave where he may lead a private 
life’”). 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. IX; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking 
down laws criminalizing the use of contraception by married couples); id. at 490, 493 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[T]he Framers did not intend that the first eight amend-
ments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights . . . . And, the Ninth 
Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically mentioned in the first 
eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental per-
sonal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, infringement.”). 
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and interference with individual and collective liberty.13  Though 
conceptions of privacy—associational,14 informational,15 physical,16 de-
cisional,17 proprietary,18 and intellectual19 conceptions—played, as it 
were, “behind-the-scenes” and “supporting actor” roles in the theory 
and practice of American constitutionalism at the beginning, they 
came to play “starring” roles in the centuries ahead.20  The Bill of 
Rights was fully ratified in 1791.21  By the time the bicentennial of the 
 
 13 See Allen, supra note 6, at 147 (citing evidence from the Federalist Papers of relevant pub-
lic-private distinctions embedded in the Founders’ and Framers’ constitutional thinking). 
 14 By “associational privacy,” I mean freedom to form and maintain exclusive social and po-
litical groups. 
 15 By “informational privacy,” I mean limited access to personal or sensitive data, confiden-
tiality and anonymity.  I will sometimes include the federal courts’ First Amendment 
“anonymity” jurisprudence in what I refer to here as “informational privacy” jurispru-
dence.  Anonymity is an aspect of informational privacy in the straightforward sense of 
limited access to information about persons (namely, information concerning their iden-
tities) or control over information about persons (again, information concerning their 
identities).  Anonymity jurisprudence is also included in what has been referred to as the 
“intellectual” privacy, since anonymity is one of the means by which individuals enjoy 
their intellectual privacy to, for example, express, and explore unpopular ideas.  See infra 
note 19. 
 16 By “physical privacy,” I mean limited spatial and sensory accessibility to others, such as 
when one is secluded alone at home behind closed doors and when one is free from non-
consensual touching. 
 17 By “decisional privacy,” I mean non-interference with certain intimate choices such as 
birth control, abortion, marriage, medical care, and consensual adult sexual partners. 
 18 By “proprietary privacy,” I mean ownership and control of the use of attributes of person-
al identity, such as voice, name, and photographic likeness. 
 19 By “intellectual privacy,” I mean the freedom to think about, read about and discuss 
ideas.  See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008) (“Intellec-
tual privacy is the ability, whether protected by law or social circumstances, to develop 
ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted gaze or interference of others.  Surveillance or 
interference can warp the integrity of our freedom of thought and can skew the way we 
think, with clear repercussions for the content of our subsequent speech or writing.  The 
ability to freely make up our minds and to develop new ideas thus depends upon a sub-
stantial measure of intellectual privacy.  In this way, intellectual privacy is a cornerstone of 
meaningful First Amendment liberties.”). 
 20 Constitutional uses of “privacy” have expanded to include those identified supra in notes 
14–19.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (protecting the physical 
privacy of a home occupied by drug dealers); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) 
(establishing informational privacy of confidential prescription data reported to states); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (protecting decisional privacy of woman’s abortion 
choices); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (finding intellectual privacy of 
pornography possession in a man’s home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 
(1967) (protecting informational privacy of man using a phone in a public booth); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (establishing associational 
privacy and informational privacy of civil rights group).  See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, 
PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 4–7 (2d Ed. 2011) (discussing legal definitions of privacy). 
 21 See Bill of Rights (1791), OUR DOCUMENTS (Jan. 1, 2012, 12:24 AM), 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=13 (providing background in-
formation on the Bill of Rights, which went into effect on December 15, 1791). 
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Bill of Rights was being celebrated in 1991,22 the Supreme Court had 
repeatedly and expressly held in landmark cases that the first ten 
amendments and the Fourteenth Amendment protect privacy inter-
ests relating to a host of core concerns.23 
The terms “privacy,” “right to privacy,” and “expectations of priva-
cy” featured prominently in landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases, 
starting with Katz v. United States24 and Griswold v. Connecticut.25  These 
cases and those for which they became precedents tested the notion 
that government must be tolerant and constrained.26  Many scholars 
now agree that human beings have dignity, autonomy, and needs by 
virtue of which they merit lives and relationships of their own.27  
When it comes to homes, conversations, social groups, political affili-
ations, medical care, sexuality, marriage, and families, people should 
be largely let alone.  Even in areas of constitutional law where privacy 
protection is not and cannot be the core concern, one finds federal 
 
 22 Cf. Warren E. Burger, Bicentennial Considerations on America’s Bill of Rights, 22 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 663, 664–65 (1992) (providing an essay based on former Chief Justice Burger’s 
keynote address when he chaired the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United 
States Constitution). 
 23 See supra note 20; see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecology, 
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and holding that 
the right to privacy compels striking down state laws impeding ready, affordable, and 
anonymous access to medical abortions), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).  Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (holding that individuals have a strong li-
berty interest in private, autonomous medical decisionmaking).  But see Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986) (holding that the fundamental right to privacy does 
not extend to homosexual sodomy), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 
(2003). 
 24 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (overturning a criminal conviction based on the warrantless in-
terception of a phone call).  The word “privacy” appeared in an exalted role in the early 
wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 473 (1928), in a famous dis-
sent by Justice Louis Brandeis.  See infra note 41. 
 25 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state laws criminalizing the prescription and use of 
contraception). 
 26 The precedents include, of course, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 27 See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY:  WHAT MUST WE HIDE (2011) (arguing 
for ethical and legal duties to protect physical and informational privacies threatened by 
contemporary practices of exposure and self-revelation); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT:  TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009) (outlining 
conception of privacy as contextual integrity to be applied to contemporary information 
privacy problems); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE:  THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011) (arguing that greater national and local security does not 
require abrogation of strong privacy protection); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING 
PRIVACY (2008) (arguing that public policy and law should reflect an understanding that 
there are a number of different varieties of privacy each with its own requirements and 
justifications); Judith DeCew, Privacy,  STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy/ (last updated Sept. 18, 2006) (making a 
strong normative case for physical and informational privacies). 
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judges marking out a terrain of legally protectable privacy-related in-
terests.  U.S. approaches to criminal punishment are premised on 
coercive isolation and surveillance.28  Yet Eighth Amendment juri-
sprudence incorporates ideals of privacy as legal constraints on peno-
logical practices.29  The Second Amendment would appear to have lit-
tle to do with privacy.30  But the jurisprudence of the Second 
Amendment has come to incorporate ideals of the places we live as 
protective sanctums wherein privileges of self-defense and ownership 
are inconsistent with gun control laws that rule out the private deci-
sion to possess readily operable handguns in private homes.  For ex-
ample, the Court recently struck down a local Washington D.C. law 
prohibiting possession of unlicensed firearm possession, including in 
private homes, on the grounds that the Second Amendment confers 
on individuals an individual right to protect themselves and their 
families.31 
 
 28 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that a prisoner has no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his prison cell); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 559–60 
(1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment-based privacy claims 
fail in light of legitimate goals and methods of criminal detention).  Cf. Wilkinson v. Aus-
tin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (holding that prisoners’ liberty interests and prisons’ needs 
and objectives must be balanced). 
 29 The Eighth Amendment provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
The ban on cruel and unusual punishment bears on how extensively prisons can withhold 
from inmates desired conditions of solitude, modesty, private communication, and confi-
dentiality.  See Merriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 418 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[A] prisoner’s 
expectation of privacy is extremely limited in light of the overriding need to maintain in-
stitutional order and security . . . . The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment stands as a protection from bodily searches which are malicious-
ly motivated, [and] unrelated to institutional security . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also 
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., conurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (noting that cultural nudity taboo warrants respect for prisoners modesty 
and privacy). 
 30 It reads:  “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 31 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008) (“[W]e hold that the District’s 
ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its pro-
hibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of im-
mediate self-defense. . . . [T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes 
certain policy choices off the table.  These include the absolute prohibition of handguns 
held and used for self-defense in the home.  Undoubtedly some think that the Second 
Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation, 
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is a se-
rious problem.  That is perhaps debatable, but what is not debatable is that it is not the 
role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.” (emphasis added)).  In 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (Alito, J.), the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
as articulated in Heller fully applicable to the States. 
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III.  CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
Notwithstanding its nontextual, implicit, judge-made origins, con-
stitutional privacy law has served as an important instrument of social 
change.  Indeed, the adoption by the Supreme Court of doctrinal 
discourses of privacy has helped to bring about significant changes in 
key societal sectors.  A notable instance in the health-care arena, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Missouri,32 led to routine ex-
ecution of “living wills” and “advanced directives.”33  Nancy Cruzan 
was an adult state hospital patient in a persistent vegetative coma.34  
Unable to eat and drink on her own, she received food and water for 
many years through tubes inserted into her body to keep her alive.35  
Missouri state hospital authorities refused a request by Cruzan’s par-
ents to cease artificial nutrition and hydration of their daughter who 
had no hope of recovery.36  The Supreme Court of Missouri recog-
nized a right to refuse treatment, grounded in the doctrine of in-
formed consent, but refused to authorize Cruzan's parents to choose 
death over life on her behalf in the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence of her own wishes.37  The Supreme Court emphasized that 
medical decision making should be in the hands of private individu-
als, not the state; but upheld the state of Missouri’s “clear and con-
vincing evidence” standard as protective of individual liberty.38  The 
Cruzan decision was interpreted to mean that the Fourteenth 
Amendment privacy interest of autonomous individuals in making 
their own life and death medical decisions could be protected by do-
cumenting their wishes in advance of coma or other cognitive inca-
 
 32 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  Widely discussed as a privacy case, the role of privacy is muted in 
the opinion that speaks of private individuals’ “liberty interest” in medical decision-
making rather than a fundamental right to privacy.  See id. at 278 (“The principle that a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”). 
 33 Cf. Robert N. Swidler, Take Your Own Advice—Please:  Advance Planning for Healthcare Deci-
sions, 83 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 20, 21 (Jul./Aug. 2011) (“When living wills first appeared in the 
1960s, the legality of the documents was uncertain, and the people who completed them 
were considered a bit idiosyncratic.  To be sure, our culture has changed dramatically 
since then, and such documents are now familiar and legally accepted.”). 
34  Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 266–267. 
35  Id. at 266 (“[S]urgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan 
with the consent of her then husband”). 
36  Id. at 267. 
37  See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408, 425 (Mo. 1988) (“[N]o person can assume that 
choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's 
Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence absent 
here.”).  
 38 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261. 
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pacity.39  Following the Cruzan decision, patients and the elderly have 
been encouraged not only to discuss their end of life wishes with fam-
ily and friends but also to execute “living wills” or other advance di-
rectives stating the types of medical interventions they would wish in 
the event of incapacity.40 
The Court’s constitutional privacy law has facilitated even more 
sweeping and dramatic movement in new directions than that 
represented by the advance medical directive.  For example, the de-
velopment of the “reasonable expectations of privacy”41 analysis in 
Fourth Amendment cases following Katz v. United States42 recalibrated 
the balance of power between citizens and law enforcement for a 
generation.  Dissenting in an early wiretapping case, Justice Brandeis 
had urged such a recalibration.43  In Olmstead v. United States, the ma-
 
 39 Since the 1980s the question of whether patient “autonomy” should alone dictate end of 
life option has become a matter of intense policy debate.  Compare Robert H. Blank, End-
of-Life Decision Making Across Cultures 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201–02 (2011) (contrast-
ing the importance that Western medicine places on patient autonomy with other world 
cultures that do not share such an emphasis), with Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, 
Enough:  The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 30–31 (2004) (arguing 
that it is against public policy to allow an individual to bind his or her future self through 
living wills). 
 40 Patsy K. Keyser, After Cruzan:  The “Values Base” to Advance Directives, 11 ORTHOPAEDIC 
NURS. 37, 37–40 (1992) (noting that, in light of Cruzan, decisions surrounding life-
sustaining treatment refocused on advance directives, such as living will and durable 
power of attorney for health care decisions and additional "clear and convincing" evi-
dence of the patient's wishes, may be beneficial); see also James F. Childress, Dying Patients:  
Who’s in Control?, 17 J. L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 227, 228 (1989) (noting that meaningful 
autonomy remains elusive despite advance directives developed in response to legal re-
quirements of informed consent applied to incompetent and comatose patients kept alive 
by new health care technologies). 
 41 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My under-
standing of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold re-
quirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reason-
able.’ . . . reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as phys-
ical invasion.”). 
 42 Id. at 359 (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  The government agents here ignored ‘the proce-
dure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment,’ a proce-
dure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveil-
lance involved in this case.  Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, 
and because it led to the petitioner’s conviction, the judgment must be reversed.” (altera-
tion in original) (footnote omitted)). 
 43 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“We 
have likewise held that general limitations on the powers of Government, like those em-
bodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not for-
bid the United States or the states from meeting modern conditions by regulations which 
a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary 
and oppressive. . . . The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions fa-
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jority on the Court agreed with the government that wiretapping ac-
complished without entering a private home or office did not require 
a search warrant.44  Concerned about the implication of technology 
for the privacy of new and old modes of communication, a forward-
looking Brandeis urged his brethren on the Court to understand pri-
vacy as an imperative of enlightened civilization.45  The jurisprudence 
spawned by Katz has had its critics,46 especially in light of problems as-
sociated with government use of and access to recent surveillance and 
communication technologies.47  Yet, after the Katz decision, it was im-
possible to design a law enforcement or surveillance practice without 
attention to whether privacy interests required a search warrant, 
court order, or procedural showing.  Privacy jurisprudence is not 
necessarily pro-privacy; and some would argue that current Fourth 
Amendment interpretations reveal a lawmaking designed less to 
shield individuals than to make “dark corners” of the modern capital-
ist administrative state visible to the maximally tolerable degree.48  
Judicial interpretations of search and seizure law after the tragic 
events of September 11, 2001, have upheld privacy diminishing legis-
lation relating to law enforcement and intelligence gathering, such as 
 
vorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual 
nature, of his feelings, and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, plea-
sure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifia-
ble intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 44 Id. at 466 (“[T]he wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 45 Id. at 478. 
 46 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511 (2010) (arguing that 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test should be abandoned); Daniel J. Solove, Digital 
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002). 
 47 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to provide a consistent explanation for what 
makes an expectation of privacy “reasonable”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012) (denying petitioner’s motion for a rehearing on the issue of whether evidence 
of illegal drug trade can be used to convict where police and the FBI secretly attached a 
GPS device to suspected drug dealer Antoine Jones’ car without a search warrant and 
monitored the car’s movement for twenty-eight days). 
 48 Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American State, 
16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 61 (2002). 
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the “roving” surveillance warrants49 and agency data-sharing50 autho-
rized by the PATRIOT Act.51 
Consider, too, by way of example, the infamous penumbral priva-
cy doctrine set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut.52  It was transformative 
and it changed American women’s lives forever.53  Prior to Griswold, 
the prescription, sale, and use of birth control was restricted by law in 
Connecticut and several other states.54  The innovative privacy doc-
trine embraced by the Court’s majority, according to which a right to 
privacy is entailed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments, cleared the way for American women to use medical 
contraception, including “the pill.”55  In Griswold, the Supreme Court 
 
 49 Uniting and Strengthening America Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (as 
amended). 
 50 Cf. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Sur. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that the 
PATRIOT Act allows government agencies to share information received through surveil-
lance of agents of foreign powers). 
 51 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (amending numerous federal law enforcement, 
financial, and communications laws). 
 52 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 53 Of course, the majority opinion of Justice Douglas in Griswold also transformed constitu-
tional jurisprudence itself.  Cf. Risa Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives:  Va-
grancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental 
Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1365–66 (2010) (highlighting where Ninth Amendment 
rights are concerned, strict scrutiny applies). 
54  For example, Massachusetts law criminalized birth control. Indeed, even today, that 
state’s largely ignored archaic law only approves administering or prescribing birth con-
trol to “married” persons.  See Washington Legislature Debates Archaic Law Banning Birth 
Control For Unmarried Women, WASH. INDEP., Oct. 5, 2011, 
http://washingtonindependent.com/113063/massachusetts-legislature-debates-archaic-
law-banning-birth-control-for-unmarried-women, a seeming limitation invalidated by the 
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird.  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 § 21A (1966) (“A regis-
tered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles 
intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception.  A registered pharmacist actual-
ly engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married 
person presenting a prescription from a registered physician.”).  See also Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding constitutional any statute whereby single persons 
may not obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy).  See generally Mary L. 
Dudziak, Just Say No:  Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court before  Griswold v Connect-
icut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 918–20 (1990) (describing federal and state restrictions on 
birth control prior to Griswold, and noting that Connecticut and Massachusetts “lagged 
behind” most other states due to influence of Catholic Church); see also C. Thomas Di-
enes, The Progeny of Comstockery—Birth Control Laws Return to Court, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 1 
(1972) (detailing a history and analysis of Massachusetts and other states’ moralistic laws 
restricting access to birth control). 
 55 See generally NANCY GIBBS, LOVE, SEX, FREEDOM AND THE PARADOX OF THE PILL:  A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL (2010) (noting Griswold ruled that the Bill of Rights implicit-
ly included a right of privacy and overturned bans on contraception by married couples); 
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struck down Connecticut’s law criminalizing married couples’ use of 
medically prescribed contraception, relying on a newly identified 
“right to privacy” grounded in what it termed the “penumbra” of the 
Bill of Rights.56  The new jurisprudence of privacy unleashed an inde-
pendent brand of American woman greatly in control of her repro-
ductive capacities,57 for whom fears about pregnancy no longer 
needed to govern decisions about sex, marriage, education, and em-
ployment.  Griswold launched “sexual” and “cultural” revolutions, 
continued by two later cases, Eisenstadt v. Baird,58 which extended the 
holding of Griswold to unmarried men and women, and Roe v. Wade,59 
which decriminalized medical abortions.60 
Roe v. Wade and more than two dozen subsequent abortion cases, 
embodied a jurisprudence of constitutional privacy for which Griswold 
was a crucial precedent, but premised on a more straightforward 
Fourteenth Amendment privacy doctrine.61  For a time a majority on 
the Court embraced Roe’s doctrine that a “fundamental” right to pri-
vacy is entailed by the individual liberty and due process guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Roe the strict scrutiny required by 
a fundamental right was applied to criminal abortion statutes.62  Such 
statutes categorically criminalizing most abortions were held to be 
unconstitutional.  Case law relying on this idea of a fundamental right 
 
ELAINE TYLER MAY, AMERICA AND THE PILL:  A HISTORY OF PROMISE, PERIL, AND 
LIBERATION 118–19 (2011) (articulating the Griswold holding and its impact on women). 
 56 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 57 But see CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:  DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
100–102 (1987) (arguing that privacy rights help preserve male control over the private 
sphere unless women are freed from coercive relationships and subordination). 
 58 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 59 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 60 Id.; see also DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY:  THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (rev. ed. 1998) (noting that the quest for decriminalizing medical 
abortions came from Roe v. Wade). 
 61 The Supreme Court applied a “compelling interest” standard in cases scrutinizing the 
regulation of abortion, beginning with Roe v. Wade.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; id. at 170 (Ste-
wart, J., concurring).  Under this highest of standard of review, a governmental regula-
tion that interferes with the decision to abort is presumed invalid; to overcome the pre-
sumption, the government must show that its regulation constraining personal choice is 
narrowly drawn to further a legitimate and compelling state interest.  Id. at 165.  The 
Court no longer applies the compelling state interest requirement of Roe in all abortion 
cases.  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court required only that 
the government establish that challenged abortion restrictions did not impose unduly 
burdensome interference on the important constitutional right to choose.  Casey, 505 
U.S. at 874–77. 
 62 Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
Mar. 2012] FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVACY 897 
 
to abortion privacy had a profound effect on women’s health.63  It led 
to fewer deaths from illegal and non-medical abortions, and in-
creased availability and usage of affordable medical abortions.64  It 
spawned moderate state laws regulating but permitting most first and 
second trimester abortions.  It helped to shape the manner in which 
women’s reproductive health services would be delivered—namely, in 
specialized, segregated clinics.  Roe v. Wade effected another social 
change that pleases no one:  the polarization of national politics and 
the creation of a pro-life/pro-choice “litmus test” of political viabili-
ty.65 
Constitutional privacy doctrines played a role in Loving v. Virgin-
ia,66 the Supreme Court decision striking down state interracial mar-
riage bans.  The end of these bans has brought demographic and 
other social changes.  Such bans were among the last strongholds of 
state-imposed segregation and ideologies of white supremacy.  Loving 
maintained that the privacy of spousal choice is both a matter of 
equal protection and substantive liberty.  After Loving, different-race 
couples no longer faced criminal penalties; the number of marriages 
 
 63 See LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME:  WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1867–1973 1–6 (1997) (“The stunning transformation in law and public 
policy regarding abortion and women’s rights was rooted in the declining conditions of 
abortion under the criminal law and built on generations of women demanding abor-
tions—and getting them.”). 
 64 It is widely recognized that the legalization of abortion decreased illegal abortion-related 
mortality and morbidity. See Willard Cates, Jr., David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, The 
Public Health Impact of Legal Abortion:  30 Years Later, Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health, 35 GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/journals/3502503.html. 
 65 See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) (describing 
how abortion was thought to have been treated as murder, both popularly and legally); 
EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK:  FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 
(1996); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion:  An Equality Analysis of a Woman-
Protective Abortion, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1030–31 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=958254 (providing an example of 
a South Dakotan abortion statute that captured national political attention due to its re-
strictiveness); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons:  Constitutional Conflict and The Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L. J. 1641, 1669 (2008) (“WPAA [woman 
protective antiabortion argument] took shape in political relationships in which the abor-
tion-hurts-women argument had important strategic functions.”); see also Linda Green-
house & Reva B. Siegel, Before Roe v. Wade, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (June 2, 2010), 
http://www. brennancenter.org/blog/archives/Greenhouse_and_Reva_B._Siegel (stress-
ing that abortion rights symbolized “the new morality—a problematic ‘permissiveness’ 
that afflicted the nation”). 
 66 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); see also Loving Decision:  40 Years of Legal Interracial Unions, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (June 11, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=10889047 (chronicling the Loving couple and state of interracial marriage after 
the landmark decision).  But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding 
ban on polygamy). 
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between African Americans and whites has significantly increased, 
along with the population of mixed race American families.67 
A mixture of equality and liberty-based constitutional privacy doc-
trines would reemerge in Lawrence v. Texas, the historic decision over-
turning Bowers v. Texas and establishing that consenting adults are en-
titled to make their own decisions about the sex of their intimate 
partners.68  Both Loving and Lawrence would have a role in the gradual 
case for gay partnership equality and gay marriage fought in the 
states, and already won in more than half a dozen states, including 
New York.69  While the path is less direct, constitutional understand-
ings of privacy articulated in Lawrence played a role in undermining 
the compromise implicit in the well-intended but misguided “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy introduced during the presidency of Bill Clin-
ton.  Under the law, gays and lesbians could serve in the military if 
they kept their sexual orientations a strict secret.70  The policy com-
promised the integrity and well-being of thousands of gay and lesbian 
service members, their families, friends, and allies.  The rule was ab-
olished in September 2011, following a careful, step-wise congres-
sional and military review overseen by President Barack Obama.71 
 
 67 Zhenchao Qian and Daniel T. Lichter, Changing Patterns of Interracial Marriage in a Mul-
tiracial Society, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1065, 1065–84 (2011) (stating that the number of 
marriages between blacks and whites is increasing—for example, in 1980, only 5% of 
black men married white women; in 2008 the number rose to 14%).  Cf. RALPH RICHARD 
BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?:  HOW THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE 
DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 37 (2011) (noting that in 2000 more than ten times as many 
African American men intermarried as in 1960); Meredith Melnick, Study:  Blacks and 
Whites Intermarrying More in the U.S., TIME (Sept. 19, 2011), http://healthland.time.com/
2011/09/19/study-blacks-and-whites-are-marrying-more-in-the-u-s/#ixzz1aF0hZOgB (not-
ing that the rate of interracial marriages between blacks and whites increased rapidly be-
tween 1980 and 2008, outpacing marriages between whites and other ethnic groups). 
 68 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986) (articulating that the liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
people the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and 
their own private lives and still retain their dignity and freedom). 
 69 New York’s Marriage Equality Act went into effect June 24, 2011.  See Marriage Equality 
Act, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a et seq. (McKinney 2011); see also Same-Sex Marriage, Civil 
Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/i
ndex.html (detailing the recent gay marriage legislation and litigation in New York, Con-
necticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, and Washington, D.C.). 
 70 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111–
321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3516. 
 71 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html. 
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IV.  FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVACY 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”72  The Amendment restricts 
government from interfering with religious freedom and free press, 
of course.  But it also restricts government from interfering with 
rights of assembly and grievance.  From these express freedoms, the 
Supreme Court has abstracted what is often termed a right of free as-
sociation, meaning a right to form and belong to groups with social, 
political, or religious purposes, including groups that may be critical 
of government.73  The Supreme Court has held that the freedom of 
association includes, inter alia, the freedoms (1) to keep membership 
and membership lists a secret,74 and (2) to exclude unwanted others 
from membership or participation in one’s exclusive groups and 
group activities.75  The Court has also abstracted a right of anonymous 
speech from the First Amendment.76  Privacies, both physical and in-
formational, are requirements of thoroughgoing freedom of associa-
tion and anonymous free speech.  Seclusion and concealment, along 
with informational privacies such as confidentiality, secrecy, and ano-
nymity have been used as specific modes of restricting access to 
people and information. 
 
 72 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 73 For cases holding that the right to associate is protected under the First Amendment, see 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 74 See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466 (finding that compelled disclosure of petitioner’s member-
ship lists was likely to constitute an effective restraint on its members’ freedom of associa-
tion).  But see Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Keri, 356 F.3d 197 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (declining to hold that freedom of association or the right to engage in ano-
nymous speech entails a right to conceal one’s appearance in a public demonstration). 
 75 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding the right of each 
group to deny membership to homosexual participants under the First Amendment); 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  
But see N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of New York City’s Human Rights law forbidding discrimination based on race, 
creed, sex, and other grounds by any “place of public accommodation, resort or amuse-
ment”); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (deny-
ing that each group’s First Amendment rights were violated when they were required to 
extend membership to women); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) 
(denying right of Jaycees, a large, non-selective civic organization, to exclude women 
from membership and upholding application of Minnesota Human Rights Act). 
 76 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (invalidating an Ohio sta-
tute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature). 
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With the examples of the Supreme Court’s sex, marriage, and re-
productive rights jurisprudence in mind, constitutional privacy law 
might appear to be an instrument of progressively liberal social 
change.  Traditions of racial privilege, heterosexual domination, and 
sexism have been weakened in the United States with the help of 
judicial interpretations of the Constitution that require protection for 
privacy interests and fundamental individual privacy rights.  But, 
viewed overall, constitutional privacy doctrines have not been entirely 
and exclusively servants of liberal social change.  The adoption of pri-
vacy-based doctrines has also been a challenge and impediment to 
liberal change.  This point is supported by a close look at the dynam-
ics of privacy jurisprudence under the First Amendment.  I consider 
three contexts:  race, sexual orientation, and gender. 
A. Race and Social Change 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson shows the ideal of freedom of 
association and related associational privacy put to liberal progressive 
uses.77  The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (“NAACP”) is a national, multi-racial civil rights membership 
organization organized under the laws of New York more than a 
hundred years ago.78  In the early twentieth century, the leaders and 
members of the NAACP devised and executed strategies designed to 
force an end to state-enforced, race-based discrimination against 
African Americans.  The NAACP was active in Alabama in the 1950s, 
where segregation on the basis of race entailed unequal political and 
economic opportunity for African Americans of every educational at-
tainment and character.79  The Alabama NAACP regional offices and 
affiliates recruited members and solicited contributions.  Among the 
goals of the Alabama NAACP was to push for desegregation of Ala-
bama’s universities and places of public accommodations, such as re-
tail stores, municipal buses, and hotels. 
 
 77 Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Anita L. Allen, Associational Privacy and the First 
Amendment:  NAACP v. Alabama, Privacy and Data Protection, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 
(2011). 
 78 See NAACP, Our Mission, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/our-mission (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2012). 
 79 See Allen, supra note 77, at 4–6 (describing the NAACP’s efforts in Alabama from 1918 on 
and the hostilities between the organization and the state throughout the 1950s). 
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1. NAACP 
The story begins in the 1950s.  Alabama had enacted a state sta-
tute which required a foreign corporation to qualify before doing 
business in the state by filing its corporate charter with the Secretary 
of State and designating a place of business and an agent to receive 
service of process.80  Seeking to expel the NAACP from the state for 
its unwelcome civil rights activism, in 1956 the Alabama Attorney 
General charged the NAACP with violating the foreign corporations 
law.81  Indeed the NAACP technically had skirted the law, but only 
because (as a non-commercial entity) it considered itself exempt.82  In 
furtherance of its bid to expel, Alabama ordered the NAACP to pro-
duce its membership list and the names of its officers and directors.83  
The NAACP tendered the required registration papers and the 
names of its principal officers and directors; but Alabama was not sa-
tisfied.  Fearing for the safety, jobs, and businesses of its members, 
the NAACP refused to produce membership lists.84  In appealing a 
$100,000 civil contempt penalty Alabama imposed as a consequence 
of the refusal to disclose the names of its membership, the NAACP 
argued that compelled disclosure of the membership lists would “ab-
ridge the rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful asso-
ciation in support of their common beliefs.”85 
The Supreme Court agreed:  “Inviolability of privacy in group as-
sociation may in many circumstances be indispensable to preserva-
tion of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses 
dissident beliefs.”86  A lack of informational privacy could “induce 
members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from 
joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through 
their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.”87  The 
Court held that  
 
 80 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 452. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. (“The Association had never complied with the qualification statute, from which it 
considered itself exempt.”). 
 83 Id. at 453. (“[T]he State moved for the production of a large number of the Association’s 
records and papers, including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the 
names and addresses of all Alabama ‘members’ and ‘agents’ of the Association.”). 
 84 Id. at 462 (“Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revela-
tion of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic 
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of 
public hostility.”). 
 85 Id. at 460. 
 86 Id. at 462. 
 87 Id. at 463. 
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immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association 
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the 
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate 
freely with others in so doing as to come within the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.88 
The court concluded that “Alabama has fallen short of showing a 
controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoy-
ment of the right to associate which disclosure of membership lists is 
likely to have.”89 
The Supreme Court’s associational and informational privacy-
based decision in NAACP was instrumental in furthering the imme-
diate goals of an important player in the civil rights movement.  The 
decision rendered more difficult future uses of similar strategies by 
officials seeking to hijack civil rights to preserve traditions of segrega-
tion based on myths of white superiority and privilege.  NAACP was 
an important precedent available to other African Americans stymied 
by threats, intimidation, and opportunistic applications of state law.90 
2. Nation of Islam 
NAACP served as a controlling precedent for a far less well-known, 
but significant lower court case brought on behalf of the Nation of 
Islam, Wallace v. Brewer.91 
In this extraordinary case, Alabama segregationists and allied state 
officials sought to use a peculiar state registration law to expel Nation 
of Islam Black Muslims, not for desegregation efforts but for pur-
chases of land intended to make segregated African Americans self-
sufficient.  Under a corporate pseudonym “Progressive Land Devel-
opers, Inc.” and with the help of two white Alabamans, the Nation of 
Islam purchased land in Alabama on which they hoped to set up an 
 
 88 Id. at 466. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (“We need not, in order to find con-
stitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this 
record . . . subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, 
petition or assembly.  For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. . . . [including] the right ‘to 
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.’” (citing Patterson, 357 
U.S. at 460)). 
 91 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (declaring a law requiring Muslims to register in Ala-
bama unconstitutional). 
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agri-business enterprise designed to employ black workers and pro-
duce wholesome, affordable food for urban markets.92 
In November 1969, residents of St. Clair County, Alabama learned 
that an entity known as Progressive Land Developers, Inc. (“PLD”) 
had quietly purchased two farms in the county totaling more than 
900 acres from two white businessmen, former state senator Ray 
Wyatt and dentist Dr. Robert McClung.93  PLD was owned by African 
American “Black Muslims” affiliated with Elijah Muhammad’s Chica-
go-based Nation of Islam.94  The Nation of Islam had previously pur-
chased farmland near Dawson and Sasser, Georgia and set up a suc-
cessful farm, dairy, and cannery.95  Muhammad reported that he 
hoped to purchase farmland throughout the south, and that the ob-
jective of his group’s farming enterprises was “to produce beef, dairy 
products and vegetables, providing jobs for black people and lower 
prices on goods shipped to Muslim stores in big cities.”96 
Not wishing to have Black Muslims operating in northern Ala-
bama, riled residents organized a “Stop the Muslims” campaign.  
Their goal was to invalidate the contracts of sale to PLD and to there-
by oust the Muslims.  The “Stop the Muslims” campaign attracted the 
support of law enforcement97 and drew some two thousand local resi-
 
 92 Interestingly, Wallace omits any details about the rich factual context of the litigation, 
which were widely reported in southern newspapers and nationally circulated magazines 
of the day all over the United States.  See, e.g., infra notes 94–107. 
 93 Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 436. 
 94 Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, SARASOTA JOURNAL, Dec. 9, 1969, at 12 (describ-
ing the plight of the Progressive Land Developers), available at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1798&dat=19691208&id=YPYeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=
-YwEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7183,2032374. 
 95 Don McKee, Black Muslims Buying Big Acreages, CORPUS CHRISTI TIMES (Texas), Nov. 20, 
1969, at 3–E (describing a 1743 acre operation managed by a northern Muslim transplant 
David Spencer and employing local non-Muslim blacks as labor), available at 
http://www.newspaperarchive.com/SiteMap/FreePdfPreview.aspx?img=100524307. 
 96 Id.; see also Joseph M. Chapman, Black Muslims . . . Mercenary or Missionary?, THE DISPATCH, 
(Lexington, N.C.), Dec. 8, 1969, at 8 (describing the plight of the Progressive Land De-
velopers), available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1734&dat=
19691208&id=y3kcAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fFEEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6885,3100860. 
 97 Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 453 n.42 (“After defendants Wyatt and Bishop discovered that 
Progressive Land Developers, Incorporated (PLD), a Black Muslim corporation, had pur-
chased land in St. Clair County, they met with defendant District Attorney Waid for the 
purpose of ascertaining how the Black Muslims could be kept out of St. Clair County.  De-
fendant Hodges, from the Attorney General’s office, a native of St. Clair County, was ap-
pointed to assist Waid in his investigation.  Waid or Hodges informed defendants Wyatt 
and Bishop of the criminal penalties and laws concerning acting as an agent for an unqu-
alified foreign corporation and the muslim registration statute.  Both Waid and Hodges 
disapproved of the Black Muslims owning land in St. Clair County.” (footnote omitted)). 
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dents to a public meeting in a Pell City high school gymnasium.98  
Opponents of the PLD purchases warned that Muslims “don’t respect 
our flag and they support communist positions in many ways while 
they regard Christianity as the enemy” and that the farms PLD had 
purchased “can easily be used for storage of weapons and training in 
guerrilla warfare.”99 
Wyatt and McClung realized a $20,000 profit on land they sold to 
the Muslims.100  Wyatt attempted to persuade St. Clair whites that PLD 
had benign intentions.101  Indeed, PLD did have demonstrably benign 
intentions.  The Muslims planned to use the land purchase to bring a 
$2.5 million vertically integrated food business to Alabama, creating 
jobs that would also “supply their ghetto stores and restaurants.”102  
Wyatt, who called himself a “strict segregationist, just like the Mus-
lims,” sold the Muslims pickup trucks and helped them secure local 
workers.103  Wyatt paid a price for economic dealings with blacks:  His 
cows were shot, twelve of his cars were splashed with acid, and his au-
to dealership burned.104  Wyatt’s own brother, Wallace Wyatt, joined 
forces against him, forming an organization called “Restore Integrity 
to Development” to derail the Muslim venture.105  An ex-con and Ku 
Klux Klan Grand Wizard, Robert Shelton entered the fray against an 
undeterred Ray Wyatt,106 as did a Baptist preacher, Reverend James H. 
 
 98 See Cordell S. Thompson, Black Muslims Fight to Keep Alabama Farm, JET MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 
1970, at 16–22 (explaining the goals of Wyatt and his organization), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=JjkDAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA22&lpg=PA22&dq=st+clair+a
labama+elijah+muhammad+nation+of+Islam+and+ray+wyatt&source=bl&ots=MJg-
MgVr03&sig=jMbkpsBn6q7avKYL-8W44M61PD0&hl=en#v=onepage&q=st%20clair%20
alabama%20elijah%20muhammad%20nation%20of%20Islam%20and%20ray%20wyatt&
f=false. 
 99 Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 436.  See Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, SARASOTA J., Dec. 
9, 1969, at 12 (describing the conflict between Wyatt and the local white residents), avail-
able at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1798&dat=19691208&id=
YPYeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=-YwEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7183,2032374; see also William Jones, Muslims 
Buy Farmland in South; Feud Stirred, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 8, 1969 (describing the Ala-
bama land feud), available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/
access/577668392.html?dids=577668392:577668392&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&type=his
toric&date=Dec+08%2C+1969&author=&pub=Chicago+Tribune. 
100 Thompson, supra note 98, at 17. 
101 Chapman, supra note 96, at 8 (quoting Wyatt as saying “All they have in mind is farming 
and employing local people to do the work at a reasonable rate”). 
102 Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, supra note 99, at 12. 
103 Thompson, supra note 98. 
104 Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, supra note 99. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (“Robert Shelton, the Ku Klux Klan imperial wizard, left a federal prison last month 
just in time to get into the fray.”); Muslims Give up Farm, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 18, 1970, 
at A9 (reporting that Klan spokesman Robert Shelton said Klan leased land adjacent Mus-
lims’ land to observe them and Elijah Muhammed announced plan to move farm to 
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Bishop.107  Dr. McClung also paid a price for working on behalf of the 
Muslims.  He lost most of his dental practice and was forced to resign 
as president of the John Birch Society.108 
Like Ray Wyatt and Dr. McClung, the Muslims and their attorney 
were targeted with harassment.  John Henry Davis was arrested in 
connection with writing a five-dollar check for the purchase of gaso-
line.109  Jimmy Holmes, hired by Wyatt after working in the Muslim 
plant in Georgia,110 was prosecuted on what appeared to be trumped 
up charges of trespass and allowing his livestock to run at large.111  
Holmes was also prosecuted for violations of a curious state law112 
criminalizing remaining in Alabama for more than one day as an un-
registered “communist, muslim or nazi.”113  An arrest warrant was 
 
Greene County in Western Alabama due to rifle fire and cattle poisonings), available at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1964&dat=19700318&id=mbwiAAAAIBAJ&sjid
=CrYFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1757,544361. 
107 See Martin Waldron, Muslims Buying Land to Farm in Alabama, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Flor-
ida), Nov. 24, 1969, at 15–A (quoting Bishop as saying “I for one am willing to lay down 
my life for the cause [of ousting the Muslims] if necessary”), available at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=888&
dat=19691124&id=QUxSAAAAIBAJ&sjid=-XsDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6958,3241637. 
108 Thompson, supra note 98, at 18. 
109 Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431, 437 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (“On December 4, 1969, plain-
tiff Davis was arrested on a warrant sworn to by defendant Bishop on a charge of violating 
Code of Alabama, Title 10, § 21 (94).  This charge developed when defendant Wyatt pur-
chased a five-dollar check from a local service station where Davis had purchased gasoline 
with the check.”). 
110 See Chapman, supra note 96, at 8 (Holmes hired by Wyatt after working on Muslim farm); 
see also Northern Alabamans Resent Muslim Move, supra note 99. 
111 Cf. Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 435 (“On January 28, 1970, from the bench, this Court further 
enjoined these defendants from prosecuting plaintiff Holmes under a warrant (issued on 
January 7, 1970) charging him with permitting livestock to run at large.”). 
112 ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 97(1)–(8) (1940), invalidated by Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 443–46. 
113 ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 97(1)–(8), 97(4a) (1940), invalidated by Wallace, 315 F. Supp. at 443–
46 (“Registration of communists, nazis, muslims, officers of communist party and officers 
and members of communist front organizations.  1.  Each person remaining in this state 
for as long as one day who is a communist, nazi or muslim or is knowingly a member of a 
communist front organization, shall register with the department of public safety on or 
before the fifth consecutive day that such person remains in this state, and at such inter-
vals thereafter as may be directed by the department of public safety.  2.  Such registra-
tion shall be under oath and shall set forth the name (including any assumed name used 
or in use), address, business occupation, purpose of presence in the state of Alabama, 
sources of income, place of birth, places of former residence, and features of identifica-
tion, including fingerprints, of the registrant; organizations of which registrant is a mem-
ber; names of persons known by registrant to be communists, nazis or muslims or mem-
bers of any communist front organization as the case may be; and any other information 
requested by the department of public safety which is relevant to the purposes of this sec-
tion.  3.  Each and every officer of the communist party and each and every officer of 
communist front organizations, knowing said organizations to be communist front organ-
izations, and each and every member of nazi or muslim organizations, knowing said or-
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sworn out for Orzell Billingsley, Jr., who had assisted with the real es-
tate sale to PLD.114  Billingsley, a prominent African American attor-
ney who had served as a lawyer for both Dr. Martin Luther King and 
Rosa Parks during the Montgomery Bus Boycott,115 was charged with 
being an agent of a foreign corporation (presumably PLD) not li-
censed to do business in the state.116  (Ray Wyatt and Dr. McClung al-
so faced these charges.)117  A civil suit was brought by Pine Forest Mis-
sionary Baptist Church against Holmes, Billingsley, and PLD, seeking 
$500,000.118  Located near one of the farms, the church alleged tres-
pass and interference with land use. 
 
ganizations to be nazi or muslim organizations, shall register or cause to be registered 
said party or organizations with the department of public safety, if said party or organiza-
tions have any members who reside, permanently or for a period of more than thirty days, 
in the state of Alabama.  Such registration shall be under oath and shall include the name 
of the organization, the location of its principal office and of its offices and meeting plac-
es in the state of Alabama; the names, real and assumed, of its officers; the names, real 
and assumed, of its members in the state of Alabama and of any person who has attended 
its meetings in the state of Alabama; a financial statement reflecting receipts and dis-
bursements and by whom and to whom paid; and any other information requested by the 
department of public safety which is relevant to the purposes of this statute.  Such regis-
trations shall be made within thirty days after the effective date of this section, and the-
reafter at such intervals as are directed by the department of public safety.  4.  Failure to 
register as herein required, or the making of any registration which contains any false 
statement or any omission, shall constitute a felony and shall be punishable by a fine of 
not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than two or more than ten years, or by both.  5.  The registration records shall be 
open to inspection by all law enforcement officers of the United States, of this state or of 
any other state or territory of the United States.  Such records may also, in the discretion 
of the department of public safety, be open for inspection by the general public.”). 
114 Orzell Billingsley, Jr. (1924–2001) was a prominent civil rights lawyer and municipal 
judge, one of the first African Americans to be admitted to the Alabama State Bar.  He 
represented ordinary and high profile African Americans including Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and Rosa Parks.  Billingsley is said to have taken “a strong interest in the eco-
nomic development of black communities.”  Billingsley, Orzel Jr. (1924–2002), BIRMINGHAM 
PUB. LIBR., http://www.bplonline.org/resources/BlackBirmingham.aspx (last visited Jan. 
23, 2012). 
115 Id. 
116 Wallace, 315 F. Supp at 453 (“Thereafter, defendant Bishop swore out a warrant against 
plaintiff Billingsley, a Negro attorney, for acting as an agent for a foreign corporation not 
authorized to do business in Alabama, Sections 21 (93)–(94), Title 10, Code of Alabama. 
Billingsley allegedly violated the statute for engaging in one specific act:  filing for record 
the deed for land purchased in St. Clair County by PLD.  Billingsley did not draft or ex-
ecute the deed but only filed it for record.”). 
117 Id. at 436. 
118 Id. at 454 (“Defendants Palmer, Hare and Cash, as Trustees of the Pine Forest Missionary 
Baptist Church, brought a civil action in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County for trespass 
against the plaintiffs and others.  The complaint seeks compensatory damages for the 
trespass and punitive damages in the amount of $250,000.00 for aggravating the trespass 
and $250,000.00 damages for denying and infringing upon the church’s use of its land.”). 
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In response to these suits and arrests, five of the individuals tar-
geted by the “Stop the Muslims” campaign filed an action in federal 
court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of them-
selves and all “(1) Negro citizens of Alabama and their attorneys and 
(2) members, friends and associates of the Lost Found Nation of Is-
lam.”119  The plaintiffs sought relief including relief “from conduct 
harassing, threatening and interfering with plaintiffs in exercising 
their first amendment rights to express themselves and associate and 
to exercise their chosen religion, and their statutory rights to hold 
and own property and to make contracts.”120  The defendants argued 
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because “the Black Mus-
lim organization is not a religion but a political organization whose 
sole advocacy is violence and black racism and whose purpose in St. 
Clair County is to establish, by means of force if necessary, a separate 
nation of its own.”121  The Muslims were denied class action status but 
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Muslim registra-
tion law at the heart of efforts to intimidate them.122 
The Court found that the registration law was vague and over-
broad.123  There was, for example, no definition of “muslim” in the 
law, which required that “muslims,” “communists,” and “nazis” who 
remained in Alabama for one day must register with the department 
of public safety and supply a host of information about themselves 
and their groups.  Citing NAACP, the Court held that the registration 
law was an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment 
right of freedom of association.  The law violated notions of associa-
 
119 Id. at 435 (“Plaintiffs premise their request for declaratory and injunctive relief upon the 
first, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution and also upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1988.”).  The 
court declined to certify a class consisting of all Negro Alabamans and their lawyers, but 
the suit went forward on behalf of the individually named plaintiffs.  Id. at 437–38. 
120 Id. at 435. 
121 Id. at 449–50 (“[Defendants argue that] Black Muslims are members of a foreign nation 
or political organization, not a religion, which seeks to establish a foreign nation within 
the United States, and in particular in St. Clair County.  They further argue that Black 
Muslims, as members of a foreign nation, are not citizens of the United States and thus 
not entitled to first or fourteenth amendment rights or equitable relief; that a state gov-
ernment has inherent governmental authority to protect itself against insurrection and 
overthrow by violence; and that the statutes attacked by plaintiffs are designed to protect 
the State’s right to a republican form of government, guaranteed by Article 4, Section 4 
of the United States Constitution.”). 
122 Id. at 443 (“For the above reasons, we conclude that section 97(4a) is an unconstitutional 
abridgment upon the first amendment right of freedom of association.”).  The plaintiffs 
sought to represent the “class of all ‘Negro citizens of Alabama and their attorneys.’”  Id. 
at 438. 
123 Id. at 440. 
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tional privacy by requiring individual “muslims” to identify them-
selves, and provide detailed personal information about themselves 
and their associates.124  The Court found that the “first amendment 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in the production of membership 
list cases [best exemplified by NAACP] is equally applicable where the 
statute requires registration of individual members.”125  The Court 
cited and quoted NAACP, as well other free expression cases:  “This 
Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to asso-
ciate and privacy in one’s associations.”126 
3. Cork Club 
It is not only groups seeking progressive advancement of African 
Americans who have the First Amendment right of associational pri-
vacy.127  The right would belong equally to a group with the polar op-
posite goal of seeking to maintain the African American community 
as a lowly, economically, socially, and politically inferior caste.128  Such 
a group would have prima facie entitlement to keep its membership 
secret from the state, no less than the NAACP or Nation of Islam.  
The federal courts’ “truly private” club cases reveal limitations, 
though, on private groups’ ability to use the First Amendment doc-
trine of associational privacy as a sword against efforts by African 
Americans to break down traditional barriers to full citizenship with 
the help of the nation’s civil rights statutes.  Wright v. Cork Club was a 
telling instance.129 
 
124 Id. at 442. 
125 Id. at 443. 
126 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). 
127 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) 
(applying the First Amendment right of associational privacy to the preaching activities of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses); MacIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (apply-
ing the First Amendment right of associational privacy to the distribution of anonymous 
leaflets opposing a proposed school tax levy); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) 
(applying the First Amendment right of associational privacy to the distribution of hand-
bills in Los Angeles).  But see John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (holding 
that with respect to referendum petitions, the disclosure requirements were sufficiently 
related to significant state interests so as to satisfy the scrutiny standard applicable to First 
Amendment challenges). 
128 Cf. Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 207–08 (2d Cir. 
2004) (stating that hooded masks worn by KKK members did not constitute expressive 
conduct entitled to First Amendment protection, and that New York’s anti-mask statute 
prohibiting the wearing of masks or disguises in public, other than for entertainment 
purposes, was not facially unconstitutional). 
129 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970). 
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In May 1967 a woman representing a social sorority contacted the 
Cork Club of Houston, Texas about holding a luncheon and fashion 
show on its premises.  Ethel Banks spoke by telephone to Al Uhlen-
hoff, auditor of the Club.130  Uhlenhoff informed Banks that member-
ship was not necessary for use of the Cork Club’s facilities and that 
sorority members would be welcomed as guests of the club’s presi-
dent.131  However, Uhlenhoff sent Banks application forms inviting 
sorority members to join the Club.132  Mrs. Noah Wright, an African 
American, filled out an application and returned it with a dues check 
for $18.00, payable to the Cork Club.  She soon received a member-
ship card in the mail.133  Except for Mrs. Wright, no African American 
had ever been issued a membership card by the Cork Club.134 
In June 1967 Wright twice visited the club for drinks, and from 
the visits the Cork Club management learned that they had conferred 
membership on a black person.  That same month Uhlenhoff wrote 
to Wright that  
“the matter of integration has never come before the membership of the 
Cork Club;” that the question of integration would be brought up at the 
next stated meeting in January, 1968; and that her membership card 
would not be active until the question was settled; Mr. Uhlenhoff also ad-
vised Mrs. Banks that the sorority’s plans for a luncheon and style show at 
the Cork Club were cancelled.135 
Wright brought a lawsuit alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act.136  
She maintained that the Cork Club was private in name only and was 
in fact a place of public accommodations subject to the provisions of 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.137 
The court stated as background for its decision that “governmen-
tal regulation of the membership of private clubs is beyond the pale 
of governmental authority.”138  Indeed, “[i]f the government were al-
lowed to regulate the membership of truly private clubs, private or-
ganizations, or private associations, then it could determine for each 
citizen who would be his personal friends and what would be his pri-
vate associations, and the Bill of Rights would be for naught.”139  Yet 
Wright prevailed.  The Cork Club was found to be a place of “public 
 
130 Id. at 1146. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (2006). 
138 Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1157. 
139 Id. 
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accommodation” with the shell of a “private club” status maintained 
primarily for purposes of complying with Texas liquor control laws 
limiting alcohol service to private clubs.140  The court found that, oth-
er than for race, the Cork Club did not carefully screen applications 
for membership, did not limit the use of its facilities or services strict-
ly to members, and advertised its facilities to the general public.141  
The club had lax membership policies, and was open to white people 
with little regard for their “good credit and good character.”142  For 
these reasons, the court concluded that the Cork Club did not qualify 
for the private club exemption provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) 
and required by constitutional ideals of free association.143 
B. Sexual Orientation and Social Change 
Two well-known First Amendment cases blended expressive free-
dom of association doctrines and privacy concepts in service of hete-
rosexual groups’ efforts to exclude homosexuals from organizations 
and activities otherwise widely open to all.  As it was used (unsuccess-
fully) in the Cork Club case, the First Amendment private association 
doctrine was used (successfully) in the gay rights cases to sustain a sta-
tus quo of majority group privilege. 
1. Boston Parade 
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton144 the Supreme Court considered whether consistent with the First 
Amendment “Massachusetts may require private citizens who organ-
ize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a 
message the organizers do not wish to convey.”145  In the succinct 
words of Justice Souter who wrote for the majority, such a mandate 
 
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(2)–(3) (2006) (stating that all persons shall be entitled to equal 
access at establishments “affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities by 
State action as places of public accommodation . . . . [including] any restaurant, cafete-
ria . . . or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on premises, 
including but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail estab-
lishment; or any gasoline station”). 
141 Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1154. 
142 Id.  But see Solomon v. Miami Woman’s Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (hold-
ing that a woman’s club with whites-only admissions policy was not formed as a sham 
simply to evade civil rights law). 
143 Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1156. 
144 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
145 Id. at 559. 
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violates the First Amendment.146  For two years running, in 1992 and 
1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council had refused to 
allow the gay pride group Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston (“GLIB”) march in an annual St. Patrick’s Day pa-
rade through the public streets of Boston.147  State officials and courts 
had found that the exclusion of GLIB from the forty-seven-year-old 
institution violated “the State and Federal Constitutions and of the 
state public accommodations law, which prohibits ‘any distinction, 
discrimination or restriction on account of . . . sexual orienta-
tion . . . relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment in 
any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.’”148  The 
state trial court found, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
agreed, that the parade fell within the statutory definition of a public 
accommodation, which was defined as any place “which is open to 
and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public.”149 
The United States Supreme Court found, however, that parade 
organizers could not be required to include GLIB, a gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual pride group, in their parade.150  GLIB’s participation could 
be perceived as support for gay and lesbian equality, especially since 
there was no traditional way for the organizers to disavow “any identi-
ty of viewpoint” between themselves and any group selected for par-
ticipation.151  In order to protect the expressive freedom of the parade 
organizers, the Court, in effect, endorsed a physical segregation of 
GLIB from the parade.  The Court seemed to over-estimate the like-
lihood that admitting GLIB would have been forcing a message of 
endorsement as opposed to mere toleration.  Permitting the parade 
organizers to segregate themselves from unwelcome gays and lesbians 
might be compared to permitting Alabamans the segregated distance 
they sought from Muslims whose viewpoints they reject.  Ironically, 
one of south Boston’s communities most associated with the St. Pa-
trick’s Day parade is now a hub of Boston’s gay community life.152 
 
146 Id. at 566 (“We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirement to admit a pa-
rade contingent expressing a message not of the private organizers’ own choosing violates 
the First Amendment.  We hold that it does and reverse.” (citation omitted)). 
147 Id. at 561–62. 
148 Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 272, § 98 (LexisNexis 
1992)). 
149 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561–63. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 See Erica Corsano, How Gay Is Southie?, BOSTON PHOENIX (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://thephoenix.com/boston/life/91293-how-gay-is-southie (“Once unthinkable, Bos-
ton’s most notorious neighborhood now sports a welcoming face.”); see also Cara Bayles, 
Gay Community Gains a Larger Voice in South Boston, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 18, 2011), 
912 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
2. Boy Scouts 
The Boy Scouts of America is an iconic institution.153  Millions of 
boys and men join to partake of opportunities for friendship, mentor-
ing, and personal growth.  The Boy Scouts is, formally speaking, a 
private, not-for-profit organization.154  James Dale was an Eagle Scout 
whose adult membership in the Boy Scouts of America was revoked 
when the organization learned that he was gay.155  The New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that state public accommodations laws prohibited 
excluding Dale on the basis of sexual orientation.156  Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale  asked the United States Supreme Court to decide, as 
Justice Rehnquist framed the question, whether “applying New Jer-
sey’s public accommodations law [construed to require admission of 
a gay man to membership] violate[d] the Boy Scouts’ First Amend-
ment right of expressive association.”157  The Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Rehnquist, held that the decision of the state supreme court 
must be reversed on First Amendment grounds.158  The majority rea-
soned that:  “The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group 
infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the pres-
ence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to 
advocate public or private viewpoints.”159 
Although this freedom of expressive association was not absolute 
and can be overridden “‘by regulations adopted to serve compelling 
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be 
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms,’”160 it was not overridden here.  The Boy Scouts organiza-
tion believed that homosexuality was inconsistent with the “morally 
straight” values it sought to instill in youth and declined to endorse 
 
http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/south_boston/2011/03/bar_by_bar_southie_g
ets_more_g.html (demonstrating South Boston’s acceptance of the gay community). 
153 See generally BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, http://www.scouting.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
154 See Unit Gifts and Tax Exempt Status, CAPITALSCOUTING.ORG, http://www. 
capitalscouting.org/capital_docs/bsa_unit_policy_update_2006.pdf (stating that Boy 
Scouts of America is a 501(c)3 charity but individual chapters are not).  See generally The 
Boy Scouts of America Annual Report, Continuing the Journey, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA (2010), 
available at http://www.scouting.org/About/AnnualReports.aspx. 
155 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
156 Id. (holding that New Jersey’s public accommodations law requiring that the Boy Scouts 
admit Dale, an avowed homosexual, violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of 
expressive association). 
157 Id. at 644. 
158 Id. at 648. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). 
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homosexual conduct as legitimate behavior.161  As the presence of 
GLIB in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade would have interfered with 
the parade organizers’ choice not to propound a particular point of 
view (we endorse/tolerate homosexuality?), the presence of Dale as 
an assistant scoutmaster would interfere with the Boy Scout’s choice 
not to propound a point of view (we endorse/tolerate homosexuali-
ty?) contrary to its beliefs. 
Private associations are entitled by the First Amendment to segre-
gate themselves in exclusive physical domains, hold secrets, confi-
dences, and embrace viewpoints and messages that may be offensive 
to others. Government cannot tell us whom or what to like.  First 
Amendment associational privacy cases, like Fourteenth Amendment 
decisional privacy cases, trade, for better and for worse, on the notion 
that privacy “amounts to the state of the agent having control over 
decisions concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from 
the agent’s love, caring, or liking.”162 
C. Gender, Technology and Social Change 
I will now consider the extent to which the First Amendment’s 
privacy jurisprudence of anonymous Internet speech contributes to 
progressively liberal social change in the area of gender relations.  I 
will consider, inter alia, the AutoAdmit case,163 an infamous example 
of anonymous Internet speech, which demeaned female law students 
with sex and sexuality-related insults, false statements, and privacy in-
vasions. 
Legal scholars now recognize “the offensive Internet” as a major 
problem, worthy of ethical, market, and even legal reforms.164  The 
Internet has brought about social change, described by Saul Levmore 
as “succeeding in remaking us as inhabitants of a small village.”165  
 
161 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 650 (“The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsis-
tent with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly with the values 
represented by the terms ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean.’”). 
162 See JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 91 (1992) (discussing the connec-
tion between the nature of intimacy and Inness’s account of privacy). 
163 See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256–57 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that a stu-
dent was entitled to disclosure of an anonymous Internet poster’s identity if she could 
make a concrete showing as to the elements of a prima facie case against the anonymous 
speaker to outweigh First Amendment protection of anonymous speech).  See generally El-
len Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web; Law Students Feel Lasting Effects of Anonym-
ous Attacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/Article/2007/03/06/AR2007030602705.html. 
164 Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:  PRIVACY, 
SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 1, 1–5 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010). 
165 Id. at 1. 
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Communication is easy, and information spreads quickly.  We know 
and are known by people like us, notwithstanding geographical dis-
tances.  But, in the case of the Internet, the descriptive term “village” 
does not denote a place of kinship and solidarity.  To be sure, the In-
ternet can be such a place.  An online patient forum might turn 
strangers with nothing in common but their gender and a breast can-
cer diagnosis into quasi-sisters.166  Yet viewed from the vantage points 
of many online sites, the Internet “village” feels more like the vicious 
pre-civil society imagined in Hobbes’s Leviathan, than the ambivalent 
but peaceful community of hut dwellers imagined in Rousseau’s Dis-
course on the Origin of Inequality.167 
The current era—I call it the Era of Revelation—is characterized 
by the wide availability of multiple modes of communication, easily 
and frequently accessed, capable of disclosing breadths and depths of 
personal, personally-identifiable and sensitive information to a un-
iverse of people rapidly.  Many Internet users are fond of broadcast-
ing what they think and feel, motivated by business and pleasure, and 
because they care about friendship, kinship, health, education, poli-
tics, justice and culture.  Many people think of the Internet as the 
most attractive and appropriate place to go to share, vent, discover, 
and be silly.  Yet there is no absolute right to say what is true, whether 
offline or online, when doing so would tortiously invade privacy in a 
manner that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.168  Nor is there 
any exemption of anonymous Internet speech from the law of defa-
mation, infliction of emotional distress, interference with contract, or 
other familiar torts.169 
 
166 See, e.g., usafmom, Breast Cancer Topic:  My Sister—the Idiot!!, BREASTCANCER.ORG (Dec. 16, 
2011, 1:34 A.M.), http://community.breastcancer.org/468 U.S. 609forum/8/topic/7796
14 (recording a colloquy among women with stage IV metastatic breast cancer begun by a 
woman complaining about her biological sister’s lack of interest in her cancer, leading 
another to reply:  “But you have all your sisters here that care so much!  So vent away and 
we will laugh and cry with you!”). 
167 See Anita L. Allen, Driven into Society:  Philosophies of Surveillance Take to the Streets of New 
York, 1 AMSTERDAM L.F. 35, 35–36, Aug. 2009, available at http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/468 U.S. 
609alf/Article/view/92/157 (comparing Locke and Rousseau’s social contract origin 
myths). 
168 Public disclosure of true but private facts is a tort recognized by the Restatement of Torts 
(Second) and many state courts.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) 
(stating that the right of privacy is invaded by the “unreasonable intrusion upon the sec-
lusion of another,” the appropriation of the other’s name or likeness,” “unreasonable 
publicity given to the other’s private life,” and “publicity that unreasonably places the 
other in a false light before the public”); see also, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stating that 
each citizen has an “inalienable right” to pursue and obtain “privacy”). 
169 See Matthew Mazzotta, Comment, Balancing Act:  Finding Consensus on Standards for Un-
masking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 845 n.88 (2010) (citing cases that 
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American Internet users may face civil liability, but we are essen-
tially unmuzzled in practice.  Some of us are often intentionally dis-
respectful and abusive.  Some in the United States exploit the privacy 
we call anonymity to say and do things through the Internet that they 
would not otherwise dare to say or do.  Online and offline anonymity 
allows the dark sides of ourselves to vent and prey with reduced ac-
countability.  Recording in private diaries would be better for some of 
the harsh discourse posted online, but publication on the Internet 
would appear to be the preference of many.  The pairing of privacy-
as-anonymity and freedom of speech contribute to what Brian Leiter 
refers to as “cyber-cesspools.”170  These are “those places in cyber-
space—chat rooms, websites, blogs and often the comment sections 
of blogs—that are devoted in whole or in part to demeaning, harass-
ing and humiliating individuals.”171  Cyber cesspools not only cause 
dignitarian, emotional, and reputational harms but they also surely 
threaten what Robert George terms the “moral ecology” of society.172 
1. Boyer, Clementi, and Deputy Jane Doe 
Martha Nussbaum warns of “objectification” and a “culture of cru-
elty” that infects online communications and harms women.173  Ann 
Bartow has raised special concerns about the impact of Internet cul-
ture on women’s emotional, dignitarian, and economic interests.174  
In addition to women, young gay men have also raised special con-
cerns about bullying and victimization online.  The murder of Amy 
Boyer in 1999175 and the suicide of Tyler Clementi in 2010176 stand as 
 
hold that requests to unmask anonymous Internet speakers require a balancing of defen-
dants’ rights to speak anonymously against plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress for harmful 
speech). 
170 Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools:  Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:  
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 164, at 155. 
171 Id. 
172 ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES:  LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN 
CRISIS 94 (2001); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL:  CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC 
MORALITY 43 (1993). 
173 Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:  
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION, supra note 164, at 79–80, 83.  See generally Ann Bartow, 
A Portrait of the Internet as a Young Man, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1079 (2010) (noting the poor 
treatment of women because of the “commoditized” sexual nature of the Internet). 
174 Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center:  The Monetization of Online Harassment, 32 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 384–92 (2009) (noting the emotional harms that women expe-
rience because of the Internet and the available legal and economic remedies for harms 
committed on the Internet). 
175 See Remsberg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005–06 (N.H. 2003) (describing how 
the murderer of Amy Boyer used Docusearch to discover Boyer’s birthdate, social security 
number, and employment information before killing her). 
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sad symbols of the destructive potential of personal and commercial 
free speech online. 
Amy Boyer was murdered by a former high school classmate Liam 
Youens, who obtained information about her work address, a dent-
ist’s office, from an online firm, Docusearch, and then stalked and 
assassinated her as she left her workplace.177  Youens stored guns and 
ammunition in his bedroom and warned of violence against Amy and 
her family.178  In 2010 a talented young musician named Tyler Cle-
menti was a freshman at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.  
He asked his roommate Dharun Ravi to let him have their room for 
the night for a date.  Ravi consented, but pulled a prank.  He remote-
ly activated the webcam on a computer in their dorm room, webcast-
ing Clementi’s same-sex intimacies all over the Internet, and letting 
everyone know about it on Twitter.  When Clementi learned what 
had been done to him, the distraught gay youth bid farewell to his 
friends online and then committed suicide.  On September 22, 2010, 
the teenager apparently leapt to his death off of the George Washing-
ton Bridge.179  Ravi’s thoughtless advantage-taking was unethical, and 
as moral (bad) luck would have it,180 it also had a devastating out-
 
176 See Lisa Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2010, at A1 (“It started with a Twitter message on Sept. 19:  ‘Roommate asked for the 
room till midnight.  I went into molly’s room and turned on my webcam.  I saw him mak-
ing out with a dude.  Yay.’”). 
177 See Patrick Meighan & Joseph G. Cote, Nashua Man Charged in Bludgeoning Murder; City 
Man, 20, Held Without Bail over Body in Street, TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), June 1, 2011, 
http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/921206-196/charges-in-bludgeoning.html (“In 
October 1999, Amy Boyer, 20, was ambushed by a gunman outside the dentist’s office 
where she worked as she got in her car.  The killer, Liam Youens, who then committed 
suicide, was a former high school classmate who stalked her online.  The case was often 
cited nationally in efforts to pass cyberstalking laws.”). 
178 See Andrew Wolfe, School Pauses to Remember Stalking Victim:  IF YOU GO; New Hampshire 
Technical Institute Hoping Memorial for Boyer Will Raise Awareness, TELEGRAPH (Nashua, 
N.H.), Apr. 29, 2009, at 1 (“Boyer was slain by a former Nashua High School classmate, 
Liam Youens, 21, who had secretly stalked her for years and wrote of his obsessions in a 
journal he published online, though his Web site remained tragically obscure until after 
her murder and his suicide.”); see also Dental School to Honor Alum, Slain Nashua Woman, 
TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), Apr. 28, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 27989183 (“A subse-
quent police investigation revealed that Liam Youens kept firearms and ammunition in 
his bedroom, and maintained a website containing references to stalking and killing Amy, 
as well as detailing plans to murder her entire family, according to news accounts.”).  Cf. 
Liam Youens, http://www.netcrimes.net/Amy%20Lynn%20Boyer_files/liamsite.htm (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2012) (creative fiction purporting to be an actual reproduction of the site 
that Liam Youens ran on the Internet, depicting his thoughts and actions). 
179 See Foderaro, supra note 176. 
180 Clementi’s act of suicide was beyond Ravi’s control, yet we judge the severity of Ravi’s 
misconduct by reference to its unlucky fatal consequence.  See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL 
QUESTIONS (1979) (cited as sources of the problematic concept of moral luck); see also 
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come, compounding the sense of its wrongfulness.  Although Ravi 
was not charged for Clementi's suicide, he was prosecuted and, in 
March 2012, convicted of bias intimidation and invasion of privacy.181 
Cass Sunstein has argued that something should be done to pro-
tect men and women “against negligence, cruelty, and unjustified 
damage to their reputations—[and] also to ensure the proper func-
tioning of democracy itself.”182  That said, to be held accountable, 
some individuals arguably deserve to have their conduct exposed on 
the Internet, even anonymously.  Whether dead-beat dads, unfaithful 
wives, bad dates, and stubborn ex-husbands should be exposed online 
is an open question.  A grossly negligent physician—who allegedly 
hired a consultant to manipulate her Google rankings and fabricate 
“five star” rave customer satisfaction reviews—caused the vegetative 
coma and premature death of a young patient who went to her for a 
minor cosmetic procedure; this physician arguably deserved to have 
individuals identifying themselves only as her former patients describ-
ing online the poor quality of care they believe they, too, had re-
ceived.183 
The “cruelty, and unjustified damage to their reputations” Suns-
tein refers to is a genuine problem.184  No one knows the precise ex-
tent of the problem, but many examples of people who wrongfully 
invade privacy and publish through the Internet have found their way 
 
Moral Luck, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (FALL 2008 ED.), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-luck.  Cf. Ian Parker, The Sto-
ry of a Suicide, NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 2012, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2012/02/06/120206fa_fact_parker. 
181 Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, 
at A1.  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:16–1 (West 2008) (criminalizing bias intimidation 
based upon a person’s sexual orientation); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14–9(c), 2C:51 (crimi-
nalizing invasion of privacy). 
182 Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:  PRIVACY, SPEECH, 
AND REPUTATION, supra note 164, at 106. 
183 Cf. Complaint, Rajagopal v. Does, No. CL10–3014 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2010-10-22-Rajagopal's
%20Complaint.pdf (describing circumstances wherein a plastic surgeon on probation for 
alleged gross negligence, stemming from a cosmetic procedure which left her patient 
permanently comatose, was accused of having hired a consultant to boost her standing in 
the community with manufactured patient views and a priority browser ranking on 
Google).  In Rajagopal, the doctor sought to unmask the identities of five persons who 
submitted negative comments about her practice on maps.google.com in 2009.  Id. at 2–
3.  She accused them of defamation, tortious interference with her contracts with existing 
patients, tortious interference with her potential contracts with future patients and con-
spiracy to injure in trade, business, and reputation.  Id. at 3–5. 
184 Sunstein, supra note 182, at 106. 
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into the courts.  In the recent case of Doe v. Luzerne County,185 a deputy 
chief of a sheriff’s department used his office computer to post and 
share video taken of a subordinate female Deputy Sheriff in states of 
undress. 
Deputy Chief Ryan Foy accompanied Deputy Sheriff Jane Doe and 
another officer to the decontamination area of the local hospital 
where they had been ordered to report for treatment of an infesta-
tion of biting fleas picked up while attempting to serve a bench war-
rant.186  Foy admitted filming Sheriff Jane Doe’s ordeal of flea bites 
and decontamination.  However, he denied stating, as Foy alleged, 
that he made his video “for training purposes.”187  The images, which 
Foy posted on the web via his office computer and showed to other 
officers, allegedly depicted Doe partly and fully unclothed, revealing 
a tattoo drawn on her back.  The tattoo was the initials of another 
woman to whom Doe had a romantic attachment.188 
Sherriff Jane Doe filed a lawsuit for invasion of privacy in violation 
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.189  The district court 
granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion on the grounds 
that Doe had failed to state a valid constitutional claim.190  The Third 
Circuit found that Doe had a reasonable expectation of privacy while 
she was in the decontamination area of a hospital191 but sustained 
summary judgment with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim on 
 
185 660 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a female deputy sheriff had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy while undergoing a decontamination procedure). 
186 Initially Doe and the other affected officers were ordered to “a nearby Emergency Man-
agement Building (‘EMA’) [to] await construction of a temporary decontamination 
shower.”  Id. at 171–72.  Foy began filming Doe there.  Doe claimed she requested that 
Foy stop filming her; but Foy denied that she made such a request.  Id. at 172. 
187 Id. at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 See id. at 177 n.6 (expressing doubt about the claim that Does’s sexual orientation was 
revealed for the first time to anyone as a result of Foy’s video).  The court stated: 
In addition to the exposure of Doe’s body in the Decontamination Area, Doe also 
asserts that Foy’s filming of the tattoo of someone’s initials on her back led to the 
discovery of the private and intimate fact that she is in a lesbianic relationship.  We 
note that initials of a person generally are not indicative of a person’s gender.  
Furthermore, such an assertion is belied by the record, which contains no evi-
dence that, as a result of the September 27 events, anyone learned for the first 
time that Doe had a girlfriend.  
  Id. 
189 Id. at 171.  She also alleged, unsuccessfully, a failure to train claim.  See id. (reversing the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the county on Doe’s constitutional right to 
privacy claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and affirming the district court’s order 
dismissing all other claims). 
190 Id. at 174. 
191 Id. at 177 (“We conclude that Doe had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in the 
Decontamination Area, particularly while in the presence of members of the opposite 
sex.”). 
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the ground that the act of recording and sharing video of Officer 
Doe was not a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.192  Moreover, the court found that Deputy Chief Foy was 
not acting in the scope of his official duties when he shot, viewed, or 
posted the video on official department computers.193  The Third Cir-
cuit reversed the district court with respect to Jane Doe’s Fourteenth 
Amendment invasion of privacy claim.194 
At least two kinds of privacy are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment:  decisional privacy, as in Roe v. Wade195 and Lawrence v. 
Texas,196 and informational privacy, as in Whalen v. Roe.197  Jane Doe is 
not straightforwardly arguing that a right of hers to be free from gov-
ernment interference with personal choices regarding intimate mat-
ters was infringed.  Hence she did not appear to be relying on the re-
productive rights or sexual privacy line of cases.  Her case before the 
Third Circuit was argued by a lawyer for the Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center,198 a clue that her Fourteenth Amendment claim, 
despite its sexual overtones, is not based on a decisional privacy ar-
gument but rather on a bold informational privacy argument that has 
begun to evolve in other jurisdictions.199 
 
192 Id. at 179. 
193 Id.  The court concluded: 
Foy’s conduct of recording and disseminating the video and images of Doe was 
not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  At oral argument, Doe’s 
counsel conceded that Foy filmed Doe for personal interest, and that Foy did not 
film Doe in furtherance of any governmental investigation.  Because Foy acted for 
personal reasons and outside the scope of a governmental investigation, his ac-
tions do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Doe’s Fourth Amendment claim.   
  Id. (citation omitted). 
194 Id. at 179. 
195 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to privacy, 
which encompasses a woman’s qualified right to terminate her own pregnancy). 
196 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a right to engage in consensual, homosexual re-
lations without governmental interference). 
197 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (recognizing an individual’s interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal information, such as prescription drug usage, but upholding the 
constitutionality of the New York statute at issue). 
198 For an electronic version of this case, including the names of counsel, see Doe v. Luzerne 
Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2011), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/
opinarch/103921p.pdf. 
199 Id. at 176 (“Although the issue of whether one may have a constitutionally protected pri-
vacy interest in his or her partially clothed body is a matter of first impression in this cir-
cuit, other circuits—including the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits—have held that 
such a right exists.” (citing Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 136–39 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding 
that plaintiff, a female civilian who was participating in a police training video, alleged 
sufficient facts to raise a triable issue of whether her constitutional right to privacy was vi-
olated where the male police officer surreptitiously filmed her in the dressing room while 
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Whalen v. Roe concerned whether, consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment interest in informational privacy, the state of New York 
could enact a law requiring pharmacists to report the names of pa-
tients receiving certain prescription drugs.200  Jane Doe’s claim could 
be construed as a claim that state employees under color of office col-
lected intimate, sensitive information and failed to protect it as re-
quired by the holding and dicta of Whalen.  In this regard, nude pho-
tography and video precedent from other jurisdictions provided 
critical support for Jane Doe’s argument.201 
2. Rotten Candy 
The cases referred to in the last section reflect a low regard for 
privacy and for the dignity of women and homosexuals of both gend-
ers.  As we will see, in the online context, one set of privacy interests 
clashes with another.  The speakers’ informational privacy interests in 
anonymous speech generally protected by the First Amendment, 
clash with others’ informational and proprietary privacy interests pro-
tected by the common law.  The common law202 and related state sta-
 
topless and without a bra)); Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 497–98 
(6th Cir. 2008) (finding a privacy violation where a middle school’s surveillance cameras 
recorded the plaintiff students in their undergarments while in the school locker room); 
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454–56 (9th Cir. 1963) (finding that the plaintiff properly 
stated a claim for a violation of her constitutional right to privacy where she alleged that, 
while reporting a sexual assault, a male police officer deceived her into permitting him to 
photograph her genitals and exposed breasts under the pretext of an investigation), cert. 
denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). 
200 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591 (“The constitutional question presented is whether the State 
of New York may record, in a centralized computer file, the names and addresses of all 
persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doctor’s prescription, certain drugs for which 
there is both a lawful and an unlawful market.”). 
201 The Third Circuit had not yet extended the Fourteenth Amendment privacy doctrine to 
nudity cases.  See Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d at 176 (“We have found the following types of in-
formation to be protected:  a private employee’s medical information that was sought by 
the government; medical, financial and behavioral information relevant to a police inves-
tigator; a public employee’s prescription record; a minor student’s pregnancy status; sex-
ual orientation; and an inmate’s HIV-positive status.” (citing Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 
560, 565 (3d Cir. 2011) (dividing these types of privacy interests into three categories:  
sexual information, medical information, and some financial information))). 
202 The Second Restatement of Torts states the following:   
652A. General Principle 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the re-
sulting harm to the interests of the other. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by: 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in 652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, 
as stated in 652E. 
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tutes203 create civil liability for highly offensive publications of true but 
private facts, for highly offensive publications that depict others in a 
false light, and for appropriation of names, likenesses, and identities 
for commercial purposes.  If the tort law of privacy potentially 
changes gender relations for the better by deterring and redressing 
gratuitously offensive speech aimed at women, the constitutional law 
of privacy, with its generous protection of demeaning, anonymous 
speech targeting women, is a potential barrier to change.  Indeed, 
First Amendment privacy-as-anonymity jurisprudence potentially 
functions as an instrument of social stasis in a world marked by tradi-
tions of gender subordination.  The common law of defamation, in-
fliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy potentially func-
tions as instruments of progressive social change. 
Male Internet users exploit their power and online anonymity and 
harm or offend women.  But women can and do exploit privileges 
and anonymity, for harmful, privacy-invading purposes, too.  The 
Yath case is illustrative.204 
Candace Yath was a patient at Fairview Clinics in Minnesota.  She 
revealed to her physicians at the clinic that she was having an extra-
marital affair.  She was tested and treated for sexually transmitted in-
 
652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or sec-
lusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the oth-
er for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person. 
652C. Appropriation of Name or Likeness 
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy. 
652D. Publicity Given to Private Life 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is sub-
ject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of 
a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 
652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other be-
fore the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if 
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person, and 
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of 
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.   
   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652A–E (1997). 
203 For the first and best known of such statutes, see, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 
(McKinney 2012). 
204 See Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (describing a 
dispute where a woman’s private sexual history was wrongly accessed and used to harm 
and offend her online). 
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fections.205  One of Candace’s husband’s relatives, Navy Tek, saw Can-
dace at the clinic and was curious about why she was there.206  Tek 
worked at the clinic as a medical assistant with access to electronic 
records of patient health information.  Tek decided to have a look at 
Candace’s health record.207  When she learned about the STD and af-
fair, two days later she e-mailed and then phoned Candace’s sister-in-
law, Net Phat, also a medical worker, and shared what she had 
learned.208  A short time later, Phat told her brother what she had 
learned about his wife.  He filed for a divorce.209  About the same time 
a MySpace.com page appeared bearing a photograph of Candace, la-
beled “Rotten Candy.”210  The page stated that Candace Yath had had 
a sexually transmitted disease, that she had cheated on her husband 
and that she was addicted to plastic surgery.211  The MySpace page was 
traced to a computer having an Internet protocol address assigned to 
a business at which Navy Tek’s sister, Molyka Mao, worked.212 
Candace filed a lawsuit against Tek, Phat, Mao, and Fairview Clin-
ics.  She alleged that all defendants invaded her privacy, that all but 
Mao had breached a confidentiality in violation of common law and 
state statutes,213 and that all the defendants intentionally or negligent-
ly inflicted emotional distress.  There were a number of issues in the 
case, but the most important is whether information posted on MyS-
pace for several days constituted “publicity” sufficient to meet the 
prima facie case requirements of the “publication of private fact” in-
vasion of privacy tort.214  In the many states that recognize the inva-
sion of privacy tort, the requirement of “publication” generally re-
quires dissemination to more than one or two people.215  The appeals 
court in Yath importantly concluded that the publicity requirement 
 
205 Id. at 38. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 39 (“Fairview investigated and learned that Tek had accessed Yath’s medical file five 
times between March 21 and May 4, 2006.  Fairview determined that Tek had no legiti-
mate business reason to do so and that, therefore, her access was unauthorized by Fair-
view policy and prohibited by HIPAA.”). 
208 Id. at 38 (“Tek called and told Phat that she saw Yath’s record and that Yath had another 
sex partner.”). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 39. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 There is no private right of action under the federal health privacy statute, HIPAA.  Acara 
v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006). 
214 Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 44 (“We hold that the publicity element of an invasion-of-privacy 
claim is satisfied when private information is posted on a publicly accessible Internet web-
site.”). 
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). 
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had been met:  “information was posted on a public MySpace.com 
page for anyone to view.  This Internet communication is materially 
similar in nature to a newspaper publication or a radio broadcast. . . 
available to the public large.”216 
3. AutoAdmit 
Anonymity is a dimension of informational privacy—limited 
access to information about personal identity.  The First Amendment 
extends to the protection of interests in anonymity on and off line.217  
Anonymity can be important because it furthers associational privacy 
interests relating to undisclosed participation in a formal group, as in 
the NAACP case;218 but anonymity can be important because it furth-
ers the interest individuals have in freedoms of speech, expression, 
and participation unrelated to organizational or group membership.  
This latter sort of anonymity interest was asserted in the AutoAdmit 
case, Doe I and Doe II v. Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, by 
anonymous Internet users who posted highly offensive comments 
about two Yale law students on a chat-room site.219 
In February 2008, two Jane Doe plaintiffs who were Yale Law stu-
dents issued a subpoena to AT&T Internet services for information 
relating to the identity of the person assigned to the Internet proto-
col address from which someone using the pseudonym “AK-47” post-
ed disturbing comments about them on the AutoAdmit website.220  
AutoAdmit is a discussion forum popular with persons seeking, inter 
alia, admission to law school, advice about how to navigate law school, 
and advice and information about legal clerkships and employ-
ment.221  An anonymous poster posted a message on AutoAdmit in 
January 2007 in which he encouraged others to “rate this HUGE 
breasted cheerful big tit girl from Yale law school” and provided a 
link to an actual photograph of Jane Doe II.  The synonymously des-
ignated AK-47 joined the thread that included posts asserting that 
plaintiff Jane Doe II  
 
216 Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 43. 
217 See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200 (1999) (hold-
ing a badge requirement removing anonymity unconstitutional); Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. 
Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding defamation suits 
may be filed against anonymous Internet speakers as “John Doe” defendants whose iden-
tities may be discovered where certain conditions are met including allegations sufficient 
to survive a motion to dismiss). 
218 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
219 561 F. Supp.2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008). 
220 Id. at 250. 
221 Id. at 251. 
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fantasized about being raped by her father, that she enjoyed having sex 
while family members watched, that she encouraged others to punch her 
in the stomach while seven months pregnant, that she had a sexually 
transmitted disease, and that she had abused heroin, and a poster 
“hope[s] she gets raped and dies.”222 
AK-47 posted that he or she, Jane Doe II, and two men (Alex Atkind 
and Stephen Reynolds) were gay lovers.223  This case eventually settled 
out of court,224 but the women plaintiffs won important victories on 
two points of law.  First, the court held that while anonymity online is 
a constitutionally protected interest, plaintiffs who assert a plausible 
case of defamation may employ subpoenas to learn the identities of 
the individuals they seek to sue.225  Defendants’ motion to quash was 
rejected.  In another victory, the court held that Internet users sued 
on account on anonymous online posts are not automatically entitled 
to proceed anonymously into litigation.226  The court found insuffi-
cient grounds for changing the default rule of identification and 
permitting the defendants to proceed anonymously.227 
Some people think of the Internet as an exceptional domain in 
which verbally and pictorially offensive speech should be given a wide 
berth.228  Faced with the problem of the “offensive internet,” courts 
 
222 Doe I, 561 F. Supp.2d at 251. 
223 Id. 
224 Yale Online Slur Lawsuit Settled, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 22, 2009, 
http://www.newstimes.com/news/article/Yale-online-slur-lawsuit-settled-185825.php (“A 
lawyer for two former Yale University law students says they have settled their lawsuit 
against several people they accused of posting sexually harassing and threatening messag-
es about them on an Internet site.  San Francisco attorney Ashok Ramani told the Hart-
ford Courant on Wednesday that the two women settled with ‘a handful of folks’ out of 
the more than 30 anonymous authors they sued and the case is over.  Terms of the deal 
were not disclosed.  Heide Iravani and Brittan Heller, who have since graduated, sued the 
message writers in U.S. District Court in Hartford, seeking at least $245,000 in punitive 
damages as well as legal expenses.  The lawsuit was over crude comments about them 
posted on AutoAdmit, a Web message board site frequented by college students.”). 
225 Doe I, 561 F. Supp.2d at 254–55 (citing Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 771 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (balancing the First Amendment right to autonomous 
speech against the necessity of discovery, the court weighed factors including whether the 
plaintiff gave notice to possible defendants, the plaintiff’s specificity concerning the of-
fending statements, the specificity of the discovery request, the necessity of the informa-
tion to advance the plaintiff’s case, the party’s expectation of privacy at the time of post-
ing and the adequacy of the claims against the defendants)). 
226 Doe I, 561 F. Supp.2d at 254–55. 
227 Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 771. 
228 An example is Adam Thierer, a research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University who writes about the importance of minimizing government regulation of the 
Internet and warns against panicked reactions to new trends and technologies.  Cf. Adam 
Thierer, Cyber-Libertarianism:  The Case for Real Internet Freedom, THE TECHNOLOGY 
LIBERATION FRONT (Aug. 12, 2009), http://techliberation.com/2009/08/12/cyber-
libertarianism-the-case-for-real-internet-freedom/ (providing an overview and history of 
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have not embraced Internet exceptionalism.  Instead, they have 
tended to view speech that would be tortious off line as tortious on-
line.229  They have, however, embraced the notion that anonymous 
speech is a compelling, protected First Amendment interest.230  Those 
who would sue to unmask anonymous speakers must make certain le-
gal and evidentiary showings in advance.231  People have a right to 
anonymous speech and that right should not be rendered meaning-
less by the subpoena power.232  Here is an important respect in which 
 
“cyber-libertarianism” and its “cousin” the philosophy known as “internet exceptional-
ism”). 
229 For a recent example, see, e.g., Deer Consumer Products, Inc. v. Little, 650823/2011, 
2012 WL 280698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 27, 2012) (“Included within the panoply of protec-
tions provided by the First Amendment is the right of an individual to speak anonymous-
ly.  The anonymity of speech, however, is not absolute and may be limited by defamation 
considerations.” (citations omitted)). 
230 See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (observing that First 
Amendment concerns are raised when the government seeks identities of anonymous In-
ternet users); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (“It is clear that speech over 
the internet is entitled to First Amendment protection.  This protection extends to ano-
nymous internet speech.” (footnotes omitted)); Indep. Newspapers v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 
432, 438–41 (Md. 2009) (“Included within the panoply of protections that the First 
Amendment provides is the right of an individual to speak anonymously.”); Dendrite Int’l, 
Inc., 775 A.2d at 760, 765 (recognizing the “well-established First Amendment right to 
speak anonymously”); In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 819–20 (Tex. App. 2007) (“[A]n 
author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
231 See Façonnable USA Corp. v. Doe, No. 11–cv–00941–CMA–BNB, 2011 WL 2173736, at *1 
(D. Colo. June 2, 2011) (“The Court finds that Skybeam has demonstrated that the bal-
ance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.  If a stay is denied in error, Skybeam will be 
required to disclose the Does’ identities, which could harm the Does’ First Amendment 
right to speak anonymously.” (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, (1976) (“The loss 
of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably consti-
tutes irreparable injury.”))); see also Mem. Supp. SkyBeam Inc.’s Emergency Mot. For Stay 
Pending Determination of Skybeam’s Objections to Mag. J. Boland’s Order Compelling 
Skybeam to Identify Defs. at 4, Faconnable USA Corp. v. Doe, No. 11–cv–00941–CMA–
BNB, 2011 WL 2173736 (D. Colo. June 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Faconnable-v-Does-Memo-Supporting-Stay.pdf 
(“[T]here is a consistent line of precedent in many different state and federal courts over 
the past ten years holding that the First Amendment requires actual notice to the ano-
nymous Internet speaker and an evidentiary showing of merit before the right to remain 
anonymous may be taken away . . . . These cases represent a careful balancing of the 
rights of both plaintiffs and anonymous defendants, trying to make it neither too easy to 
compel identification, which could create a chilling effect on protected speech, nor too 
hard for plaintiffs to pursue meritorious claims.”). 
232 See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“If Inter-
net users could be stripped of that anonymity by a civil subpoena enforced under the lib-
eral rules of civil discovery, this would have a significant chilling effect on Internet com-
munications and thus on basic First Amendment rights.”); see also Columbia Ins. v. 
Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“People are permitted to interact 
pseudonymously and anonymously with each other so long as those acts are not in viola-
tion of the law.  This ability to speak one’s mind without the burden of the other party 
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privacy law has been simultaneously an instrument of social change 
and stasis.  The courts’ informational privacy-as-anonymity holdings 
have enabled the new Internet-based technologies of social and 
commercial communication to flourish.  The habit of globally net-
worked free expression represents a cultural transformation.  Unfor-
tunately, the content of the free expression this transformation has 
enabled is “business and usual” when it comes to gender relations:  
Leiter’s cesspool.233 
But, as the balancing of interests in anonymous speech and civil 
prosecution found in the AutoAdmit case shows,234 American courts 
have been careful not to allow claims of mere offense and bad taste 
to, as it were, drain the cesspool.  But they have facilitated civil ac-
tions, by, for example, denying that Internet subscribers have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber information—
name, address, phone number, and e-mail address—conveyed to 
their Internet service providers.235  Torts committed online do not get 
a free pass on account of respect for anonymity.236  First Amendment 
privacy law has potential as an instrument of social change and social 
stasis. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
One might wish to live in a progressively changed world in which, 
first, African Americans were not burdened by legacies of legally en-
forced slavery and segregation; second, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals 
were welcome in all corners of social, community, economic, and po-
 
knowing all the facts about one’s identity can foster open communication and robust de-
bate . . . . People who have committed no wrong should be able to participate online 
without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file a frivolous 
lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court’s order to discover their identity.”). 
233 Leiter, supra note 170, at 155. 
234 Cf. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2010) (identifying standards 
guiding recent courts in balancing discovery and the right to anonymous speech in com-
mercial speech and other cases). 
235 First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1–500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 247 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[C]ourts 
have consistently held that Internet subscribers do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their subscriber information—including name, address, phone number, and e-
mail address—as they have already conveyed such information to their ISPs.” (citation 
omitted)). 
236 Several categories of speech fall outside the protection of the first Amendment whether 
they are online or offline, namely “obscenity, fraud, defamation, true threats, incitement 
or speech integral to criminal conduct.”  United States v. Cassidy, CRIM. RWT 11-091, 
2011 WL 6260872, at *6 (D.Md. Dec. 15, 2011) (citations omitted) (finding that defen-
dant’s blog and twitter activities caused severe emotional distress could be protected 
speech). 
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litical life; and, third, in which women were not so routinely assaulted 
on the basis of their gender and sexuality to the detriment of their 
privacy, reputations, and security.  This imagined world has yet to 
come fully into existence. 
As this essay observes, privacy jurisprudence grounded in the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments has played a singular role in 
the struggle for equal rights and citizenship for African Americans, 
women of all races, and gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans.  First 
Amendment privacy jurisprudence has played an especially historic 
role, starting with NAACP.237  But neither the associational privacy nor 
the privacy-as-anonymity legacy of NAACP238 exclusively serves liberal 
causes.  Women, minorities, and gays may be excluded from truly pri-
vate clubs, parades, or the Boy Scouts; and most online anonymous 
speech viciously targeting blacks, women, and gays may have to be to-
lerated. 
Like the 1950’s hate-mongering segregationist, venomous online 
speakers today can use anonymity to shield racist, sexist, and homo-
phobic speech.  Fortunately, a number of courts have opened their 
doors to lawsuits when anonymous speech crosses traditional lines of 
tort and copyright liability, allowing plaintiffs to unmask offenders 
and bring them to civil justice.239  Measures limiting anonymity are 
privacy jurisprudence too, and can contribute to an understanding of 
privacy law as an instrument, not of harmful, hidebound tradition or 
new technology-assisted freedom to hurt and offend, but of progres-
sively liberal social change. 
 
 
 
 
 
237 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
238 Id. 
239 Some courts permit unmasking anonymous Internet posters when the tough Dendrite and 
Cahill standards are met.  An Illinois appeals court has rejected Dendrile and Cahill in favor 
of a more generous standard in a case alleging online defamation.  See Maxon v. Ottawa 
Publ’g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 674–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“There is no question that cer-
tain types of anonymous speech are constitutionally protected.  However, it is overly 
broad to assert that anonymous speech, in and of itself, warrants constitutional protec-
tion . . . . We find nothing in these cases to support the proposition that anonymous In-
ternet speakers enjoy a higher degree of protection from claims of defamation than the 
private individual who has a cause of action against him for defamation.” (citing Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334 (1995); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Talley v. Califor-
nia, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)). 
